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INTRODUCTION

U
nited States animal production systems are at the threshold of a major new method for daily management of environmental control-the integrated electronic control system. These systems generally consist of a controller which is placed in or near the facility or zone to be controlled, with connections for sensors such as temperature, relative humidity, ammonia concentration, water flow or pressure, and various analog and/or digital inputs for feedback purposes. Control connections can include such items as analog or digital output to secondary control devices.
Examples of control are fan speed control, typically done with an analog signal sent to a triac controller, which in turn modulates the fan speed. Fan speed control may utilize speed feedback for more precise control on some systems. Another more prevalent example of control is fan staging, in which sequentially activated relays (either on the main controller, or in a separate box) are used to increase ventilation in stages, as the difference between inside temperature and controller setpoint increases.
Widespread adoption of this technology has the potential for improving production efficiencies through lower management costs, energy savings, and better feed conversion efficiencies. This is expected to occur due to the superior ''control resolution" that such systems have, compared with conventional mechanical thermostat control systems. Also, as the size of intensive livestock production systems has increased, environment control in these larger production systems, using conventional thermostat technology, requires many individual mechanical thermostats which are nearly impossible to synchronize.
However, the technical problems of transient surge protection and appropriate mechanical backup systems have not been adequately addressed by the integrated control system industry. Clearly, as livestock production systems increase in size, the costs associated with a complete failure of the environmental control system can be catastrophic for the owner of the facility and the livestock or poultry housed. Controller failure can occur from a variety of causes that are not always predictable. A properly designed and installed system should be capable of maintaining basic life-support functions even after controller failure (Gates et al., 1992a) . Therefore, mechanical backups are an essential control system component, even when transient overvoltage protection has been provided.
Currently there is a small market in two fundamentally different "integrated" control systems. These systems can be described as follows:
1. Analog devices which effectively bring all environmental control input/output functions to a central device. These units are effectively "smart" thermostats for staging fans, heaters, coolers, air inlets, and/or curtains. Additional equipment is usually necessary for management functions such as feed, light, and automated weighing. 2. Microprocessor-based devices which, in addition to all the functions described above, may be programmed to monitor system performance, and provide warnings of detected problems. They also may control feeding, light, and automated weighing and can be connected to centralized computer systems (usually PC based) for remote control and access to current and past conditions in the facility. One potential advantage of both of these systems over conventional methods is the integration of many control circuits into one device, with a resultant reduction in errors resulting from incorrectly calibrated or set thermostats, timers and other equipment. Integrated controllers can provide the user with a more "global" perspective of the entire control system, and allow for rapid determination of component equipment failure.
Producers who have adopted these systems generally report greater ease of use, more uniformly maintained environmental conditions, and better feed conversion efficiencies. Problems with microprocessor units, however, include loss of memory and occasional "wild" performance from unknown external stimuli, often blamed without justification on "dirty" power or lightning.
This report describes the results of transient overvoltage tests performed on 16 currently available environmental controllers. The objectives of this woik were to: 1) Design, develop, and use a transient surge generation circuit to effectively evaluate, in a standardized procedure, the inherent surge protection of current commercial controllers. 2) Identify the degree to which transient surge protection is being provided by current manufacturers of integrated controllers.
CONTROLLERS TESTED
Both analog and microprocessor systems were evaluated. Testing performed on the units was focused on the effect of transient overvoltage (waveform pattern as given by ANSI/IEEE C62.41-1980) imposed directly to the power supplies and temperature sensors of the controllers. A brief overview of the controllers is given here, and a complete description of these controllers, their functions and features, can be found in Gates et al. (1992b Gates et al. ( , 1991c .
Sixteen commercially available environmental controllers from fourteen different manufacturers were tested. A summary of controller features is given in Table L These models are not identified by manufacturer due to confidentiality agreements. The models ranged from simple analog stage controllers to sophisticated units with the ability to control multiple modulating devices simultaneously (e.g. air inlets, fan speed, motorized shutters). Of the sixteen different controllers, ten utilized a microprocessor. Thirteen units had internal power supply circuits, rather than some type of external supply such as a "wall pack".
Several units were constructed with mild steel or other unsealed enclosures inappropriate for the harsh environment for which they were designed (according to advertisements). Apparent concern by manufacturers regarding proper sealing varied considerably, as judged by instructions and usage labels. Several of these same units also incorporated some type of alarm feature, and consequently violate ASAE Standard S417.1 (ASAE, 1989) with respect to appropriate enclosures. Sensors for the controllers consisted of one or more inside temperature readings, and for one controller, relative humidity also. Seven units used an outside temperature sensor. Several units had no means for temperature sensor calibration; two of these units (8 and 9 in Table 1 ) had uncorrectable errors in excess of 3.5^ C (8° F).
Most units were configured strictly for staged ventilation (i.e., no modulating control such as fan speed). Six to eight control relays were typical of the units, although this varied tremendously. Most units utilized "dry contact" control relays so that installers could use whatever control voltage was appropriate for the coils of the relays that switch the power equipment. The second waveform specified by ANSI C62.41-1980 is an oscillating ring wave with a 0.5 microsecond rise time, 100 kHz frequency, and sufficient damping to reduce each subsequent peak by 60% of the previous peak. A maximum of 6 kV amplitude is specified for this ring wave. These waveforms are described and graphed in Standler (1989), EH (1990), and ANSI (1980).
It is important to note that the actual transient imposed on the equipment under test (EUT) is a function of the energy available in the transient, the open-circuit waveform, and the input impedance of the EUT.
Consequently, it is effectively impossible to faithfully represent all transients that might be encountered. Rather, because considerable research has been done to quantify the magnitude of transients encountered, the Standard specifies a "worst case" energy content from which the above mentioned waveforms were derived. For a particular application, an appropriate test category for the EUT is selected, and the Standard specifies the appropriate waveform shape and magnitudes (Dash and Straus, 1990a) .
There is substantial evidence that the ANSI waveforms are insufficient to characterize transients from either load switching or lightning, in terms of the rise time and the pulse duration. Odenberg and Braskich (1985) measured 277,612 transients in 63 separate locations (nine different cities) over a two-year period. They measured voltage and current waveforms simultaneously. Their principal finding was longer duration voltage and current waveforms than used in the test standard waveforms.
No available standards address a system-wide protection scheme (Uman, 1988) , and most standards were developed prior to the development of microelectronics applications (IEEE, 1970). Consequently, most surge testing equipment still incorporates the waveforms stipulated by ANSI C62. 41-1980 41- (ANSI, 1980 41- , 1981 41- , 1987 .
As such, the selection of an appropriate transient waveform for testing electronic equipment must necessarily be made with the intended use of the equipment in mind. To protect devices such as electronic controllers used in the agricultural industry, a cascaded system of protection is widely recognized as being necessary (Standler, 1989; Buller, 1987; NFPA, 1986; IEEE, 1982; Lee, 1978 Lee, , 1979 Timmons, 1968) .
In this scenario, both the building and power service are equipped with lightning protection equipment to divert and shield the building components from direct lightning strikes. The equipment consists of air terminals connected with a uniform array of down leads to ground conductors around the building. Grounding of both the lightning protection system, and the electrical service, are crucial to proper operation of the protective equipment (IEEE, 1982; ASAE, 1988; NFPA, 1986). The main service primary is provided with surge protection (a "lightning arrestor") by the power utility.
The building transient protection scheme consists of the external lightning diversion described above, and a surge suppressor, typically a varistor or spark gap sized to clamp and short out any large transient components, installed on the power service. Additionally, a third level of protection is a transient surge suppressor on each electrical circuit that powers equipment that is sensitive or costly.
Finally, sufficient additional surge suppression is necessary on any critical devices within the structure to withstand any residual transients that may have passed through the first three levels of protection. This on-board protection is also typically the only protection for any additional input/output lines to the controller, such as temperature sensors.
Selection of an appropriate test waveform thus requires several assumptions regarding the level of transient protection being used in conjunction with the equipment to be tested (Dash and Straus, 1990a, 1990b; EFI, 1990 ). For the purposes of this study, we began with the presumption that complete transient protection as described above would be provided. The magnitude of the test waveform can then be selected based upon guidelines from the literature (e.g.. Dash and Strauss, 1990a). These suggested values ranged from the full 6 kV for "long" branch circuits and outlets (specified in ANSI C62.45-1987 as category A); 3 kV for "short" branch circuits and load centers (specified in ANSI C62.45-1987 as category B); 1 kV for cascaded protection in which one or more varistors (nominally clamping at 600-1000 V) have already intercepted a portion of the transient (EFI, 1990; Standler, 1989), down to 50-100 V for data lines (Standler, 1989; Odenberg, 1982; Clark, 1989) . T -(Vo+t20 VD ^ 40
TRANSIENT TEST PROCEDURE
(1) Using this basic circuit, we conducted discharge tests for three cases: 1) with neither EUT nor E2 in the circuit; 2) with only E2 in the circuit; 3) with both EUT and E2 in the circuit.
The limiting component affecting the test waveform magnitude was the capacity of the MOS HEXFET used to switch the capacitor discharge circuit. The maximum pulse voltage that the HEXFET was capable of sustaining was 1000 V at 19 A, which clearly limited the severity of the tests. A more preferable approach would be to utilize a commercially available surge generator. However these surge generators are rather expensive. Thus the tests reported here are not particularly severe tests of the equipment and this should be considered when evaluating the test results.
The tests were first done on the power supply lines, with the EUT powered off. Ten applications of the test pulse, with approximately a 20-30 s delay between applications, were done. The EUT was then powered up and checked. Then, the EUT was subjected to 10 to 15 additional tests while power was applied. The resultant actual magnitude of the imposed pulse varied with the phase of the power line.
Finally, a series of tests were performed on a temperature sensor line on each controller. The initial test magnitude was approximately 45 V, followed by 60 V and then 100 V. Operation of the controller was checked after each pulse, and if the controller failed, testing was discontinued. The transient voltage was applied directly to the two sensor leads, with approximately 0.5 m of wire from the discharge circuit to the controller.
RESULTS OF CONTROLLER TESTS
The tests performed on the power circuits of sixteen electronic controllers both with and without power resulted in no noticeable damage to the controllers. Since all controllers utilized a step down transformer to provide low level voltage (typically 12 V), these transformers effectively reduced the imposed test transient by the input/output ratio of the transformer.
For a few controllers which used 240 VAC, we provided a step up transformer to perform the tests with power to the EUTs. Consequently, these controllers had an additional inductance between the transient surge and their power supply in the imposed test transient voltage.
Tests on the controller temperature sensor lines resulted in three obvious failures: one unit failed at 45 V ( fig. 3) , one unit failed at 60 V, and one unit failed at 100 V. Two of these three units utilized analog control; the third utilized a microprocessor. All other units appeared to function normally for imposed transients as high as 100 V. An oscilloscope tracing of one of the failures ( fig. 3) suggests that a component failure occurred early in the transient discharge, resulting in a slight "dip" in the voltage, followed by a continued rise and subsequent voltage decay.
Symptoms of the three failures were varied. One controller failed with all the cooling relays closed and all heating relays opened, and was clearly damaged because no digits were displayed, only a decimal point. Another controller's temperature indication locked onto 28.8° F (probably the low limit value for the temperature circuit) and the entire display flashed, indicating a minimum 
DISCUSSION
The transient surge generation circuit that was developed to test controllers is a successful and relatively inexpensive alternative to commercially available units. The chief limitation of this design is that the maximum discharge voltage must be less than 1 kV, due to the HEXFET device used as a switch to initiate the discharge. For sensor circuits, and other data lines with lower overvoltage test thresholds, the circuit presented in figure 1 is quite adequate.
The results of the overvoltage tests on the controller power supplies indicate that these supplies are reasonably designed, despite the lack of any standard set of design specifications. As described above, however, these tests were of very modest magnitudes and never exceeded 740 VAC. Selection of a power supply transformer is very important because this provides essential isolation between possible transients and the controller power supply. Transformers block common-mode voltage, such as occurs when a transient raises the ground reference potential suddenly. However, parasitic inductance is a problem in transformers which do not have adequate shielding between primary and secondary coils (Standler, 1989) , and if these shields are not adequately grounded their value is also lost. Many of the controllers tested had no visible shielding around the supply transformer, and only three had supplies external to the enclosure. While all units survived these limited overvoltage tests, visual inspection of the designs suggested a general lack in following guidelines for power supply design. These guidelines can be summarized as (Standler, 1989 The specification of a test protocol for environmental control units should incorporate the following information: 1) peak values of overvoltage; 2) description of transient waveform applied to each conductor; 3) requirement that the unit should be on during testing; and 4) the number and frequency of test sequences performed to assess degradation. Additional specifications regarding the power supply ability to withstand over and under voltages, and brief outages (i.e., number of cycles "slipped"), should also be provided. Industry acceptance of a rational test protocol can provide very effective and rapid adoption of this technology, without the major problems associated with poorly designed transient protection.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on results of the research reported here, the following recommendations are offered.
TESTING
The development of a standard waveform and test procedure to supersede ANSI C62.41-1980 and C62. , that is more appropriate for simulating actual measured power line transients, is recommended. Once such a test protocol is developed, ASAE, in cooperation with controller manufacturers, should adopt it as a standard test for both the controller power supply and sensor lines. Manufacturers should also specify the number of complete power cycles that can be "slipped" without disruption, and the allowable range in supply voltage.
ALARMS
A method for alarm notification due to temperatures outside of specified limits should be integral to each installation. A systematic and standardized approach to controller operation when an alarm condition is noted should be adopted by ASAE. Such an approach must take into account the issue of liability.
MECHANICAL BACKUP
Thermostat and timer backups should be installed to provide basic life supporting functions in the event of controller failure. Controller failure alarms, such as a watchdog timer, should be developed by manufacturers to provide early warning of failure. The ASAE should provide a leadership role in the development and promotion of standardized methods for mechanical backup of integrated control systems.
